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Summary
Literature has always looked at co-operation in the shipping industry with some benevolence, justifying 
agreements among operators with the fear that, due to huge fixed costs in the management of freight 
liners, fierce competition might result in monopolies and eventually jeopardise users’ benefits. 
Containerisation and standardisation of supply has strenghtened the arguments for co-operation in liner 
shipping. Containerisation emphasizes co-operation aiming at capacity rationalisation and extension 
of geographical/temporal scope. 
While co-operation causes benefits for the transport industry as it reduces the risk of operators, 
guarantees higher profits and regulates the supply, does it also increase the consumers’ surplus, or does 
it cause lower benefits and eventually inefficiency? In fact, liner shipping is barely the sole industry 
heavily exempted from antitrust regulations, both in Europe and North America, usually with the 
blessing of the shippers themselves. 
The paper, moving from the recent decision of EU regarding maritime liner sector (Commission 
Decision C(2002)4349 - Case COMP/37.396/D2 – Revised TACA), and from the EU Commission 
issues Consultation Paper on the review of Regulation 4056/86 (concerning maritime transport), aims 
at investigating how antitrust set of rules, at the EU scale, have to “monitor and control” the market in 
a proper way according to the emerging trends of integration in the maritime logistic sector.
Keywords: liner shipping, conferences, anti-trust regulation
1. Introduction
Intra-firm co-operation ranks among the major organizational innovations to have 
taken place in the liner shipping industry (LSI) over the last decades.
The economic literature has studied in depth the causes for this phenomenon in the 
LSI, both in terms of horizontal and vertical forms of co-operation. The former involving 
firms producing the maritime transport services, the latter in the form of cooperation 
between shipping liners and terminal operators and/or land transport operators (the 
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so-called Multimodal Transport Operators, or MTO). Since the advent of conference 
agreements, liners have experienced considerable variety in forms of co-operation, 
ranging from conferences to consortia, from slot charters to strategic alliances. The 
first form of co-operation is the Conference agreement, aimed at providing a regular 
and reliable liner service in a “stable trading environment where service and rate levels 
are not subject to wild swings” (as reported in the web page of the USSEC - United 
States South Europe Conference). 
In over one hundred years of liner services, Conference agreements were the 
first form of co-operation to appear. The most modern form are strategic alliances, 
which group conference members (also those belonging to different conferences) and 
independent liners. According to Ryoo and Tanopoulou (1999), strategic alliances give 
the opportunity to: 
(i) widen operative borders of a single firm;
(ii) achieve the scale suitable to compete in global markets; 
(iii) quickly enter new markets so maximizing the return (output) of each partner’s 
resources (input).
The literature has analysed in detail this topic both through theoretical and practical 
studies, highlighting the effects of different forms of co-operation on the single firm, 
the maritime transport industry as a whole, the logistics industry, and on the supply 
chain. The results, in a broad sense, were that co-operation may be necessary to pursue 
competition inside the market. Song, (2002) in his study on the ports of Hong Kong 
and those of South China, coined the new term of ‘co-opetition’.
Academics have seldom investigated the effects of co-operation on consumers 
and whether the economic benefits gained by carriers through co-operation aiming to 
limit competition inside the market, are in fact also passed onto consumers.
The real point, as pointed out by the OECD, is whether “these practices – and the 
anti-trust exemptions granted to them by most countries – are beneficial or harmful 
to society at large” (OECD, 2002), and if the indulgent attitude of most governments 
towards these agreements should be consequently replaced by regulation that protects 
competition within the sector. 
Within the same broad topic, what is noticeable is that over the last few years there 
has been increasing market concentration. Recent data published by BRS-Alphaliner 
(referring to 1st January 2004) show that the top 25 liner companies account for about 
79.6% of the whole container fleet (expressed in number of Teu) in comparison to 
77.4% of the previous year. Clearly, the matter is complex and cannot be investigated 
thoroughly in this paper.
Here, after a brief description of how the economic literature and European Union, 
through its regulations and institutions, have considered these practices over the last 
decades (§2), a detailed report of the revision process of EU Regulation 4056/1986 
is presented. The authors suggest a possible interpretation of the economic nature 
of these services in order to derive some policy lines. This paper is the most recent 
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link in a chain of surveys that have investigated over nearly six years different issues 
related to this broad topic, such as the reform of Italian port regulation (Marchese, 
Musso, Ferrari, 1998), the existence of an optimal size for port terminals (Musso, 
Benacchio, Ferrari, 1999), the technical efficiency of container terminals (Marchese, 
Ferrari, Benacchio, 2000), the market structure of container terminals (Ferrari, 2000; 
Ferrari, Benacchio, 2003) and the role of co-operation and competition in the liner 
sector (Musso et al. 2001).
2. Literature and institutional behaviour in regard to liners’ co-operation
Since the first appearance of Conference agreements in the late 19th century, the 
literature has tolerated liners co-operation agreements for different reasons. 
Revisiting the Ryoo and Lee (2002) distinction of liner shipping co-operation 
forms into co-operation on rates and operational co-operation, some justifications to 
co-operation agreements are founded on the economic structure of the liner industry. 
They focus on the fact that:
• liner operators face ever decreasing short marginal costs (the marginal cost 
curve runs below that of average costs). Consequently, a free market may 
result in destructive competition, which undermines the basic characteristics of 
liner services, such as frequency and reliability of schedules, and the certainty 
that services will be provided ahead of demand. This argument represents the 
economic foundation for rate fixing, yet it implies that in order to stabilize 
rates, conferences will charge rates in line with the average cost of their less 
efficient members;
• the standard investment for each plant unit – in this case, a specialized liner ship 
such as a full containership – has increased over time; only large organizations 
can bear the financial burden associated with placing a new ship on the 
market, and new ships are becoming increasingly bigger in order to exploit 
the economies of scale and scope;
• there are substantial imbalances in traffic flows on the different routes served 
by liners in nearly all markets, resulting in voyages made with part of the ship’s 
capacity used to carry ballast.
Some other arguments regard the structure of the market in which liners operate. 
Namely:
• the presence of an empty core, resulting in (and confirmed by) an unstable 
equilibrium of the market subject to frequent adjustments (Sjostrom, 1989; 
Pirrong, 1992);
• the pressure to move towards a hub-and-spoke structure, encouraging further 
mergers and alliances, while conferences remain a sort of bulwark in defence 
of a certain degree of competition within the market (Marchese, 2000);
• total volume of traffic is not sensitive to freight rate variations in the short run 
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(Heaver, 2001);
• last but not least, the role that liner shipping has always had in the development 
of international commerce and economic development.
All these reasons have determined a generalized, although not unanimous, 
acceptance of price-fixing agreements, also because in the long run liners’ prices 
have experienced some reductions in real terms, following the general level of prices. 
However, the attitude towards conference agreements has not always been completely 
supportive of the carriers’ position. Over the last few decades, some forms of competition 
have been introduced in the liner market. This was sometimes the result of an internal 
spur, such as in the case of the compulsoriness of the “open conferences” in order to 
protect the existence of independent carriers. Their existence increases the competitive 
degree of the market, even if they rate trying to price off conferences instead of 
competing with conference on price. In periods of scarce demand, competition may 
be limited by agreements between conferenced and non-conferenced liners such as 
Capacity Stabilisation agreements and the Discussion Agreements, by which liners 
attempt to control the supply capacity and the level of rates.
At other times, pressure to increase the level of competition was external, as when 
regulatory changes occurred allowing more flexible pricing mechanisms. For example, 
the US Ocean Shipping Act of 1998 – known and referred to from now on as OSRA 
(Ocean Shipping Reform Act) - that abolished the requirement that service contract 
terms should be made public (as well as the “me-too” clause). Conference tariffs still 
have to be published, but shippers and carriers may negotiate confidential service 
agreements and keep the terms of the contracts safe from other carriers or shippers.
The effects of OSRA-OECD (2002) and Gardner et al. (2002) are shown by the 
great success of such confidential agreements (+200% increase) and the number of 
amendments filed. The marked shift towards individual service contracting determined 
the suspension of conference agreements on many US trades.
Moreover, the previous US Shipping Act of 1984 led to “a generalised decrease in 
rates with little impact on service” (OECD, 2002). The same (or an even better) result is 
expected as a consequence of OSRA. Available data are not as yet sufficient to support 
conclusive comments. However, data published in the web site of Containerisation 
International show an increasing gap between westbound and eastbound freight rates 
in the transatlantic and transpacific routes since 1999 (see figures 1 and 2). This seems 
to show that US exports have benefited a wide reduction in rates since 1998 OSRA.
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Fig. 1 – Transatlantic freight rates
Source: Containerisation International web site
Fig. 2 – Transpacific freight rates
Source: Containerisation International web site
In the European Union, conference liner operators benefit from more favourable 
conditions, since the EU in 1986 provided them with a block exemption from the anti-
trust legislation. At the moment there is considerable debate as to the effectiveness of 
such an exemption. The Freight Transport Association, for example, claims that the 
block exemption should be removed as its members want flexible and transparent but 
not fixed rates. This matter is the subject of detailed analysis in the next section.
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3. The Rationale of the Exemption of Council Regulation 4056/86
3.1 The legislative framework
Council Regulation 4056/86, which came into force on 1st July 1987, ended years 
of speculation and uncertainty about whether the competition rules of the EC Treaty 
applied to undertakings engaged in maritime transport. Regulation 4056/86 marked the 
first step in imposing effective regulatory constraints on a sector that had previously 
been largely self-regulated. 
Regulation 4056/86 is grounded on the acceptance of liner conferences as 
legitimate, and indeed the most common form of organization of liner shipping. 
On being adopted, Regulation 4056/86 was intended to supplement the rules of the 
UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, to which the EU Member States 
were signatories.
Central to the decision to accept liner conferences was the assumption that, if 
unfettered by the peer pressure typical of liner conferences, individual lines would 
engage in “destructive” competition, driving down margins to a level where there 
would no longer be any financial incentive for a carrier to maintain a regular service 
on those trades.
Under the assumption that liner conferences have a stabilizing effect and that 
they contribute to providing reliable scheduled maritime services, the idea behind the 
Regulation was that such stability and reliability cannot be obtained without cooperation 
within liner conferences relating to rate-setting and capacity restrictions. The Regulation 
stated, therefore, that agreements between carriers concerning the operation of scheduled 
maritime transport services that have as their objective the fixing of rates and conditions 
of carriage, and, as the case may be, one or more of the objectives listed in Article 3, 
(a) to (e), for example coordination of timetables, the allocation of cargo or revenue 
among members or the regulation of carrying capacity offered, are exempted. The 
block exemption also covers agreements between conferences and transport users 
concerning the latter’s use of conference services. Various obligations listed in Article 
4 of the Regulation are attached to the exemption. 
This block exemption is often called the most generous exemption ever given as 
it covers traditional hard-core restrictions and furthermore does not contain a review 
clause and remains in force for an unlimited period of time1. 
1 By way of comparison, the consortium block exemption (Regulation 823/2000) is valid for only 
five years at a time, after which it is reviewed to see whether the conditions for exemption are still 
in place.
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3.2 Recent caselaw
The adoption of Regulation 4056/86 was followed by a long period of conflict 
over the interpretation of the Regulation. The Commission strenuously defended a 
strict interpretation, consistent with the guidance for the application of Article 81(3) 
provided by settled case law (i.e. not to allow inland price-fixing and to promote 
confidential individual service contracts), while carriers sought to have the broadest 
possible interpretation given to the wording of the block exemption provisions. 
During the 90s a string of prohibition decisions by the Commission and ensuing 
procedures before the Community courts were held. 
In 1994, in the TAA (Trans-Atlantic Agreement) case, the Commission objected 
to, amongst other things, collective fixing of tariffs for the inland leg of multi-modal 
transport operations. The same issue arose in the FEFC (Far East Freight Conference) 
case, also in 1994, and in the TACA (Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement) case in 
1998. The issue was resolved by the Court of First Instance (CFI) in its ruling in the 
FEFC case in 2002, stating that the scope of the exemption is limited to transport by 
sea from port to port and does not cover the inland on- or off-carriage of cargo as part 
of inter-modal transport operations. As for individual exemption of inland price fixing, 
it was found in that case that a less restrictive rule according to which inland services 
may not be charged at less than costs was sufficient to achieve stability and thus price 
fixing could not be deemed indispensable. Another issue in the Commission’s TAA 
decision was the notion of “uniform” rates in Article 1(3)(b) of the Regulation defining 
liner conferences. The TAA had applied a two-tier tariff structure, differentiating 
between former conference members and independents. The Commission’s findings 
were recently confirmed by the CFI, which stated that “uniform” means the same rates 
being offered by all members of a conference. 
The Commission in the TAA case also found that the regulation of capacity 
exempted under Article 3(d) of Regulation 4056/86 does not encompass a capacity 
freeze. Only capacity withdrawals fall within the scope of the block exemption, and, 
even then, only if withdrawals are intended to address short-term fluctuations and 
generate substantial cost savings that can be passed on to transport users. The CFI did 
not need to pronounce itself on this issue. 
The 1998 Commission decision regarding the “first” TACA recognised major 
infringements of the competition rules leading to two forms of abuse, and refused to grant 
exemption to the member companies and fined them heavily. The first abuse concerned 
the conferences fixing of freight forwarder commissions, and certain restrictions 
on the availability and content of service contracts (in particular, a prohibition on 
member companies entering into individual contracts, and restrictive clauses applied 
to individual service contracts). The second abuse concerned measures by a dominant 
conference seeking to induce potential competitors to join the TACA rather than take 
part in the transatlantic trade as independent lines. The decision was appealed and 
the CFI’s judgement of 30 December 2003 substantially upheld the Commission’s 
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findings that the restrictions in relation to service contracts constitute an abuse (the 
first abuse). It has, however, set aside due to lack of evidence and an infringement of 
defence rights that part of the decision concerning the measures inducing competitors 
to join the conference (the second alleged abuse of a collective dominant position)2. As 
for the inland part of the contracts for transport services provided as part of intermodal 
transport, in respect of which immunity does not apply, the Court found that the 
cooperation of the companies in question, and the legal uncertainty over the finding of 
abuse constitute mitigating circumstances which justify no fine being imposed. In May 
2000, the Commission adopted its decision in the FETTCSA case, and fined the parties 
to the agreement, which included the FEFC and a number of individual carriers, for 
having entered an agreement not to provide a discount on published rates for charges 
and surcharges. The Commission’s decision was upheld in the CFI’s judgment of 19 
March 2003 (but the fine was annulled because the five-year limitation had expired).
Finally, in November 2002, the Commission granted an individual exemption for 
the revised Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement (“the revised TACA”), replacing 
the agreement prohibited by the Commission in 1998. The decision deals with cargo-
handling services in ports and is in this respect in line with the FEFC judgment. 
Regarding capacity regulation, the decision imposes a reporting obligation on the 
parties to the Commission and an obligation not to increase tariff rates in conjunction 
with a capacity regulation programme or to create an artificial peak season. Provisions 
regarding agreement service contracts and multi-carrier service contracts were held to 
fall outside the scope of the block exemption, but qualified for an individual exemption. 
The Revised TACA - cleared in November 2003 - can be seen as a concrete attempt to 
change the way Conferences put agreements into practice. The rapid improvement in 
the competitive structure of the market allows Mr. Mario Monti to consider the Revised 
TACA as “the most competitive outcome that can be achieved under the current legal 
regime” (despite some black spots such as the collective fixing of terminal handling 
charges).
4 The on-going review process of Regulation 4056/86
The lessening of market shares by Conferences (as was clearly shown during the 
Revised TACA clearance procedure), allied to the publication by the OECD Secretariat 
of a report that severely criticised the need for Conferences’ antitrust exemption, 
influenced significantly the Commission’s decision to re-examine the justification for 
the EU liner conference block exemption.
2 The Court therefore annulled the Commission’s decision in so far as it found that the TACA parties 
had abusively altered the structure of the market, together with the fines imposed in respect of the 
second abuse (approximately 90% of the total amount).
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Whilst the Commission recognises that price stability as an objective may 
fall within the scope of Article 81(3) EC enabling as it does shippers to forecast 
transportation costs and thus their income more accurately, with the additional benefit 
of making it easier to organise regular, reliable and efficient services, it is questioned 
whether conferences are a necessary and proportionate means to that end. It is also 
questioned whether a balancing of these benefits against the disadvantages caused to 
consumers, in particular in the form of potentially higher prices, does not in fact produce 
a situation that is detrimental to consumers.
The Commission’s Consultation Paper states in detail the grounds for a review, 
which has to be seen as part of the general – and ongoing – overhaul of the competition 
rules. The grounds are as follows:
- the issue whether reliable scheduled maritime services can be achieved by 
less restrictive means than horizontal price fixing and capacity limitation, 
also considering major changes in market conditions occurred since 1986 
(indispensability and proportionality of the immunity);
- international liner shipping policy developments and the re-examination of 
antitrust immunity in the US, Canada, Australia and Japan;
- main findings of the OECD Secretariat’s Report on Competition Policy in 
Liner Shipping, which alleged that there is no evidence that the current EU 
conference system leads to stability of freight rates and/or reliability of liner 
shipping services in a better way than within a broader competitive setting;
- effects that will be induced by the so-called Modernization of the European 
antitrust procedures (Reg. 1/2003)3.
Concerning the procedures for the review, the Commission has opted for a three-
stage approach, with the first consultation paper being followed by a Green Paper 
– outlining several possible options – or a White Paper – focusing on one particular 
option – and thereafter, if appropriate, by a proposal for legislation. 
At this stage, the consultation paper has been published addressing specific 
questions related to costs and benefits of the antitrust exemption for Conferences. Thirty 
one parties (representing bodies and government organizations) replied to the invitation 
of the Commission and submitted comments on the mentioned paper4. A lively public 
hearing took place on 4 December 2003 in Brussels, where carriers and shippers pleaded 
their respective cases. The two industries rather a-critically defended their own interests: 
3 Once Regulation 1/2003, which among others abolishes the opposition procedure, enters into 
force, applications made to the Commission under Article 12 of Regulation 4056/86 will lapse. 
Applications pending a decision by the Commission will thus not be considered after 1 May 
2004, but exemptions already granted under Regulation 4056/86 will remain in force for their full 
duration.
4 An team of researchers of the Erasmus University Rotterdam was chosen by the Commission to 
assist in processing public submissions received in response to the consultation paper.
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shippers are in favour of abolishing immunity for that form of cooperation, arguing 
it has not contributed to stability, reliability and competition, while carriers argue the 
opposite. In fact they claim that, since liner shipping is a high fixed cost industry, as 
a result of regularity and frequency of services, marginal cost pricing may not be able 
to ensure sustainable services in the long run, to the ultimate detriment of consumers 
and shippers. This is why liner conferences have been allowed to set rates, ensuring 
in this way that long run average costs are covered. The evaluation of the submitted 
comments and the contents of the public hearing provided no new evidence or proof 
that compounds the already well known theoretical arguments in favour of or against 
the block exemption for liner conferences. Moreover, data are lacking, and those 
available are not 100% reliable5.
Despite the different possible evaluations as to the degree of satisfaction concerning 
the early follow-up to the consultation process, as yet now it seems that there is no clear 
and sound evidence of the balance between the social costs of the exemption and its 
benefits for the consumer, since there is no measurable cause-effect relation between 
conferences and stability of freight rates, reliability of services etc, and there is no 
proof whether rates would have been lower or higher without conference protection. 
The “analytical” phase under the well known refrain “more work is needed” runs the 
risk not only of being never-ending, but also ineffective in pursuing “objective” proof 
of this cause-effect relation6 through statistical analysis. (It does, however, highlight 
the problem of the burden of proof). 
The positions and arguments of both shippers and carriers are to some extent 
comprehensible, but it should not be forgotten that the review is mainly a political 
economic one in which regulation costs are weighed up against foreseeable benefits. 
Regulators should therefore decide clearly which priorities should drive the revision 
process towards a (new?) sustainable market structure (regulated, partially regulated or 
deregulated) for liner shipping in the light of its peculiar features (and not vice versa). 
Thus, the oft-quoted “uniqueness” of the shipping industry should be carefully assessed 
in order to take into account possible effects of different goal-oriented regulation, 
and not as an a priori statement for preventing any change in the present legislative 
framework.
5 Real commercial data in liner shipping are always covered by secrecy and parties sometimes adopt 
an uncooperative “prove if you can” code of conduct towards institutions. It is not a coincidence 
that data provided by the European Liner Affairs Association during the review process comes 
from a Drewry report or from official liner conference prices (which, they say, represent less than 
20% of the volumes).
6 Nevertheless, a price-cost margin analysis still has not been carried out for liner shipping. 
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The present debate highlights furthermore some crucial issues regarding the 
key feature of liner shipping, which might help institutions to identify the principal 
guidelines of the review:
- can the excess of capacity observed on some trades be considered a signal 
of a shift in market power from carriers to shippers with a consequent effect 
in reducing freight rates and increase volatility, or does it represent a sort of 
barrier to entry set by conference members?
- Considering the lower market share of Conferences, as stated in the Revised 
Taca decision – which means more external competition from independent 
players - and the increasing importance of Individual Service Contracts – which 
means more internal competition – why should carriers defend collective price 
fixing immunity? Isn’t it becoming increasingly irrelevant? Or might it hide 
the need for horizontal transparency allowing to signal a non cost-oriented 
target price which affects further negotiations with shippers? 
Moreover, the review should preferably also focus on the fulfilment of the 
indispensability requirement in the light of the increasing importance of forms of 
technical co-operation such as consortia, whose discipline (regulation 823/2000, 
which expires in April 2005), should be taken into account in the revision of regulation 
4056/86. 
5. Conclusions
As we discussed in the previous sections, there are theoretical foundations both in 
favour of and against the block exemption from antitrust regulation granted to the liner 
shipping industry (LSI). Thus, the ongoing review of EU Council Regulation 4056/86, 
as well as any other possible reform of this matter, will tend to reflect the contrast 
between players with different bargaining power. The output of the review could well 
fail to achieve the highest overall benefit, for at least three reasons: 
– in the negotiation, any benefit hinged on a small number of players (the 
carriers), who are also in a position to quantify the benefit easily, normally 
overcomes those interests that are widely dispersed among a number of 
players that are not easily quantifiable or even perceivable due to information 
asymmetries, despite the fact that these benefits may be more significant; 
– policy makers may consequently favour highly concentrated interests, which 
also tend to cluster in stronger lobbies;
– industrial organisation gives the highest bargaining power to a player or to 
a group of players that backs a regulation different from one that maximizes 
welfare.
This contraposition, and the related risks, is evident in the debate currently in 
progress in the European Union, and there is a real danger that the output of the ongoing 
regulatory review will not generate the highest overall net benefit. Consequently, the key 
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point to be investigated is whether the block exemption of LSI from antitrust regulations 
causes comparatively higher costs or higher benefits for the economy as a whole. 
From this point of view, the welfare-maximising solution can be attained if and 
only if: 
1. the overall benefit for players taking advantage of the exemption is higher than 
the sum of disadvantages resulting for all other players, both on the demand 
(shippers) and on the supply side (competitors); and 
2. this benefit is transferred, due to a competitive structure of the market or to 
specific regulations, to the economy as a whole. 
Economic theory, besides bringing well-established arguments in favour of 
promoting and protecting competition as a “general” rule, also specifies cases in which 
agreements restricting competition are expected to bring macroeconomic benefits (see 
above, section 2). In the LSI there has been, historically, scope for granting exemption 
from antitrust regulations, the main benefit of which is claimed to be, given the peculiar 
characteristics of this industry, the preservation of stable and durable supply; fierce 
competition would otherwise cause a dramatic shortage, with considerable damage 
for the shippers. However, we must now wonder whether these arguments, albeit 
theoretically exact given certain hypotheses, are still today well-founded . 
Two different ranks of arguments must be raised here, respectively on theoretical 
and empirical grounds. As regards the first point, significant changes which have 
taken place over the last 10-20 years in the transport and logistics industry must be 
considered. How do globalisation and technical or organisational innovation in the 
transport industry influence the demand for transport services and its elasticity? 
On the one hand, the breaking up of most production processes makes demand 
comparatively inelastic, since it reduces – all others being equal – the alternative of 
demanding goods produced in the local economy. In other words, once the international 
division of labour takes place, and substantial savings are attained through it, it is no 
longer conceivable that increasing rates of maritime transport will cause a shift in 
demand from goods imported to goods produced locally just as it is untenable that 
there will be a change in production organisation from a globalised to a spatially 
concentrated paradigm . This is even more the case if we refer to single components 
of goods produced or assembled elsewhere. 
On the other hand, the ongoing reduction of real direct transport costs, caused 
by a rate of technical innovation over the last decades far higher than in the rest of 
the economy, normally reduces the incidence of transport on the final value of the 
transported goods.
There are then reasons to believe that the demand for maritime transport tends 
to become more and more inelastic. Therefore, as the economic literature points out 
(see Sjiostrom, 2002), consequences are worse – for any given level of demand – if 
the industry is not characterised by competition: in theory, a non-competition market 
does not bring welfare losses at all if demand is perfectly elastic, while losses become 
increasingly greater if demand becomes inelastic. Thus, this circumstance suggests that 
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in our case the social cost of exemptions is growing over time. As regards the empirical 
evidence, the significant fall in conferences’ market share over the last few years (see 
for example fig. 3 concerning transatlantic trades), as well as the growth of individual 
service contracts within the conference7, seem to suggest that the exemption is no longer 
indispensable for ensuring a supply of transport service which is both adequate and 
stable over time. Besides, the decreasing rates for US exports after the 1986 reform 
act (see above, fig. 1 and 2) suggests that the structure of the conference agreeement 
influences the whole range of rates. 
Consequently, the most signifcant role of conference agreements seems to be the 
establishment of rates which act as a point of reference and basis of negotiation for 
all other rates, both inside (individual service contracts) and outside the conference 
agreement. 
Fig. 3 – TACA/Revised TACA Conference Market share in 1994-2001
Source: Process on data and information contained in EU commission “Revised TACA” 
decision
7 ELAA (European Liner Affairs Association) in its response to EU Discussion Paper, states that “The 
Association estimates that 90 percent of TACA parties’ transatlantic lift is pursuant to confidential 
individual or joint service contracts” and that in FEFC trades “There is only a limited amount of 
cargo carried under the conference tariff” while “The Association understands that according to 
the TEANZC around 75-80 percent of cargo now moves under this type of contract”.
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Conference rates are likely to be linked to the average costs of the least efficient 
among the carriers of the agreement, which in principle should allow both individual 
contractors and outsiders to earn extra-profits by raising rates lower than those 
established by the agreement, yet higher than their costs. It seems then that, both 
inside and outside the conferences, margins for positive competition (leading to higher 
technical and allocation efficiency) already exist, albeit carriers persist in asking for 
block exemptions from antitrust regulation. 
It has often been claimed that there is no clear evidence of the balance between 
the social costs of the exemption and its benefits for the consumer, since there is no 
measurable cause-effect relationship between conferences and stability of freight rates, 
reliability of services, etc.. As a matter of fact, the analysis runs the risk to be never-
ending and also ineffective in pursuing objective proof of that cause-effect relation 
through data analysis. Yet, if there is no evidence, it seems that the “general” rules 
should apply (i.e. antitrust and competition enforcement), while the burden of proof 
should fall upon those who ask for exemption from that rule. 
Moreover, what actually is the public interest that should move the regulatory 
reform? Since the review is mainly a moment of economic policy, regulators should 
clearly decide which priorities have to drive the revision process towards a (new) 
sustainable market asset for LSI in the light of its peculiar features. Therefore, what 
is the main public interest pursued by the regulation? Basically, the efficiency of 
international trade and the availability of reliable means for trading. In this light, the 
needs of shippers can be seen as a proxy of public interest (assuming they transfer the 
efficiency gains along the chain).
After all the above mentioned remarks, can we still think that LSI is such a “unique” 
industry to justify the preservation of the broader block exemption under EU law? A 
cost structure with (very) high and largely prevailing fixed costs is not an exclusive 
characteristic of maritime liner transport, but indeed of a growing number of industries, 
which nevertheless are not granted any exemption from antitrust regulations.  
The problem should rather be – in LSI as well as in other industries – to try to 
avoid the abuse of dominant positions. As a result, the problem is not so much the cost 
structure itself but the fact that excessive fixed costs allow a dominant position which 
can determine abuses. The block exemption seems clearly the less suitable tool in 
order to avoid this risk, and – on the contrary – favours (or can favour if coupled with 
lack of transparency, etc.) the establishment of a dominant position. Thus, it seems the 
time has come to cancel the block exemption, and to shift the burden of proof onto the 
carrier, who has an interest in exploiting it.
Nevertheless, in so doing one must take into account certain elements that might 
jeopardise the benefits expected from overcoming the block exemption, such as the 
following:
– to what extent may the risk of carriers’ rent seeking induced by the exemption 
be counterbalanced by positive effects? Can the high number of players be 
considered as proxi of competition?
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– What is the “value” of stability for consumers? Are stable prices, even if issued 
by a cartel, better than transparency and cost oriented rates? Can a possible 
lower stability of supply and rates be insured? 
– How, within the meaning of Article 81(3), can the condition of “indispensability” 
be applied to the evaluation of the conference system? Can, for instance, 
consortia be considered as less restrictive alternatives in assuring the same 
goals to LSI currently provided by Regulation 4056/86?
– Without the block exemption, which strategies, tools and powers would 
national and/or international antitrust authorities use to protect consumers from industry 
abuses in case of further concentration?
It seems then that, despite these possible dangers, the tendency towards the 
abolishment of the block exemption should be definitely pursued. 
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Koja antitrustovska pravila odgovaraju promicanju 
održive konkurencije u linijskom brodarstvu?
Sažetak
Literatura uvijek nastoji surađivati s pomorstvom dobronamjerno, opravdavajući dogovore među 
brodarima sa strahom da bi visoki fiksni troškovi upravljanja teretnim linijskim brodovima i snažna 
konkurencija mogli dovesti do monopolizma i tako ugroziti interese korisnika. 
Kontejnerizacija i standardizacija ponude oznažila je argumente u korist suranje u pomorstvu. 
Kontejnerizacija naglašava suradnju u cilju racionaliziranja kapaciteta i širenja u zemljopisnom 
prostoru odnosno vremenskom opsegu
Dok suradnja donosi korist prijevoznoj industriji smanjivanjem rizika poslovodnih brodara, jamči 
veću dobit i upravlja ponudom, povećava li ujedno i viškove u korist potrošača ili pak umanjuje 
korist i time dovodi do neučinkovitosti? Zapravo, linijsko brodarstvo je očito jedina grana oslobođena 
antitrustovskih propisa, u Europi kao i u Sjevernoj Americi, obično uz blagoslov samog krcatelja. 
Cilj je ovoga rada, polazeći od nedavne odluke EU glede sektora linijskog pomorstva (Odluka 
Komisije C(2002)4349 - Slučaj COMP/37.396/D2 – Izmjene TACA), kao i od Konzultacijskih radova 
EU Komisije o pregledu Propisa 4056/86 (u vezi s pomorskim prijevozom), istražiti kako zbirka 
antitrustovskih pravila, na razini EU, treba na pravilan način “pratiti i nadzirati” tržište u skladu s 
novijim integracijskim trendovima u sektoru pomorske logistike.
Ključne riječi: linijsko brodarstvo, konferencije, anti-trustovski propisi
147
M. Benacchio, C. Ferrari, E. Musso Which antitrust rules are suitable for promoting sustainable...
Pomorski zbornik 42 (2004)1, 131-148
Quali norme anti-trust per incentivare una competizione 
Sostenibile nel settore del trasporto marittimo di linea?
Sommario
La letteratura ha sempre considerato con benevolenza le forme di co-operazione avvenute all’interno 
dell’industria dello shipping, giustificando tali accordi con il timore che una competizione eccessiva 
– data gli ingenti costi fissi che caratterizzano la gestione dei servizi di linea – potesse dare luogo nel 
lungo termine a tendenze monopolistiche capaci di catturare gran parte del surplus dei consumatori.
Il processo di standardizzazione e contaneirizzazione dell’offerta ha ulteriormente rafforzato le ragioni 
a sostegno di forme di co-operazione tra le imprese di linea volte alla razionalizzazione della capacità 
offerta e al raggiungimento di economie di scopo grazie all’ampliamento delle reti servite.
Tali forme di co-operazione consentono benefici all’industria che le realizza, in quanto riduce il rischio 
a carico degli operatori, garantendo maggiori profitti per le imprese e una regolazione all’offerta di 
mercato, ma quale effetto producono nei confronti del consumatore finale?
Il trasporto marittimo di linea è la sola industria che beneficia di un’esenzione totale dalla normativa 
antitrust sia in Europa che in Nord America, pure con il consenso dei caricatori.
Il lavoro prende le mosse dalla recente decisione dell’UE concernente il trasporto marittimo di linea 
(Decisione della Commissione C(2002)4349 - Caso COMP/37.396/D2 – Revised TACA), e dal 
Consultation Paper sulla proposta di revisione del Regolamento 4056/86 (concernente il trasporto 
marittimo), con l’intento di investigare se la “cassetta degli attrezzi” dell’antitrust sia in grado di 
monitorare e controllare il mercato in relazione alle recenti tendenze in atto nel settore del trasporto 
marittimo di linea.
Parole chiave: conferenze marittime, trasporto marittimo di linea, regolamentazione anti-trust

